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CIVIL RIGHTS-NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENTS FOR EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITIES LOCATED IN SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH Do NOT ON THEIR FACE RECITE
DISCRIMINATORY CONDITIONS, Do NOT VIOLATE MUNICIPAL ANTIDISCRIMI-
NATION LAWS.
Between August 1970 and December 1973, the New York Times pub-
lished approximately 19 advertisements for employment opportunities
available in the Republic of South Africa. Some of these advertisements
included detailed job descriptions and required qualifications for manage-
rial positions and teaching positions in various South African universities,
but none contained any reference to race or racially based discrimination.,
On October 12, 1972, the American Committee on Africa, with two other
groups and one individual,' filed a complaint with the New York City
Commission on Human Rights, alleging that, as a matter of law, there
existed in the Republic of South Africa discrimination in employment
based on race, color, and national origin; that the purpose and effect of
certain South African laws was to deny nonwhite workers equal access to
job opportunities; and that the advertisements in the New York Times
expressed this discrimination in violation of the New York City antidis-
crimination laws.' After a review of certain South African statutes, which
had been introduced as evidence by the complainant, the Commission
under the heading of "Conclusions of Law,"' found that the advertise-
ments were expressive of discrimination in employment within the prohibi-
tion of the Administrative Code of New York City,' and that such adver-
tisements constituted aiding and abetting unlawful discriminatory prac-
tices in employment in violation of that code.' On review of the Commis-
sion hearing, the Supreme Court of New York County set aside the Com-
mission order and entered judgment for the New York Times.7 The Appel-
' The advertisements ranged in size from short, six-line, one column notices to a full-sized,
four column box display. Specified reply addresses were given in New York, Washington,
London and South Africa but personal interviews could also be arranged in New York.
2 New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d 1046,
362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
Id. at 1047, 362 N.Y.S. 2d at 322.
There were no findings of fact.
The Administrative Code prohibits employers or employment agencies from printing or
causing to be printed "any statement, advertisement or publication" which "expresses, di-
rectly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination as to age, race, creed, color,
national origin or sex, or any intent to make such limitation, specification or discrimination,
when based upon a bona fide occupational qualification." NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §
B1-7.0 (i)(d).
It is unlawful "for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of
the acts forbidden" by the terms of the antidiscrimination laws. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE § B1-7.0(6).
I The court ruled that the Commission, in effect, had questioned the employment methods
and practices of a foreign government and the Commission's jurisdiction did not extend to
activities conducted within other countries. New York Times Co. v. New York Comm'n on
Human Rights, 79 Misc. 2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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late Division of the Supreme Court affirmed.8 On appeal to the Court of
Appeals of New York, held, affirmed. Advertisements which merely refer
to the Republic of South Africa as the situs of employment and which do
not recite on the surface any discriminatory conditions, do not express
discrimination within the meaning of the New York City antidiscrimi-
nation laws since such advertisements do not thereby aid and abet invidi-
ous discrimination practices which may exist within the Republic of South
Africa. New York Times Co. v. New York City Commission on Human
Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1977).
New York State has established strong prohibitions against discrimina-
tion in general, as evidenced both in the statutory law of the state and in
the decisions of its courts.9 The New York legislature has declared that
practices of discrimination against any of its citizens because of race,
creed, color, or national origin are a matter of concern for the state, since
discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its
inhabitants, but also the very institutions and foundations of a free demo-
cratic state.'0
New York Times Co. v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 49 A.D.2d 851, 374
N.Y.S.2d 9 (App. Div. 1975). The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court decision hold-
ing that the "language of the advertisements is not such as to indicate an intent on the part
of the petitioner to participate in a program of discrimination." Id. at 852, 374 N.Y.S.2d at
10.
I The scope of the Civil Rights Law is expressed in the Consolidator's Note on the Civil
Rights Law of New York:
The proposed "Civil Rights Law" embraces these principles of organized society
commonly expressed in documents known as "Bill of Rights," and such other re-
lated principles as have not found expression in any of the other consolidated laws.
Such of these principles as now exist in the State Constitution and also in the
statutes have been omitted from this chapter, as the State Constitution is the
highest and best repository for them, and are so numerous and so scattered through
the body of our laws that it is impracticable and inexpedient to disturb them. Those
that are contained in the proposed compilation are (1) such of the historic principles
as found their last statutory expression in this State in the Revised Statutes, except
those contained in the State Constititution, and (2) such related matter as seems
appropriate to the "Civil Rights Law."
N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW (McKinney 1971).
'0 The Executive Law, which describes the purposes of the statute, expresses the legisla-
ture's concern in this area:
(1). This article shall be know as the "Human Rights Law"
(3). The legislature hereby finds and declares that the state has the responsibility
to act to assure that every individual within this state is afforded an equal oppor-
tunity to enjoy a full and productive life and that the failure to provide such equal
opportunity, whether because of discrimination, prejudice, intolerance or inade-
quate education, training, housing or health care not only threatens the rights and
proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of
a free democratic state and threatens the peace, order, health, safety and general
welfare of the state and its inhabitants. A division in the executive department is
hereby created to encourage programs designed to insure that every individual shall
have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the economic, cultural and intel-
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The Constitution of New York State contains general safeguards de-
signed for the protection of individual civil rights." But in order to supple-
ment these constitutional safeguards, numerous statutes have been en-
acted to insure the specific prevention of discrimination based on race,
creed, or color in certain areas. The main statutory provisions regarding
civil rights are found in the Civil Rights Law,'" which reflects the general
principles of the New York Constitution and those principles of public
policy which have not been expressed in other consolidated laws of the
state. Additionally, forceful public sanctions against discrimination, as
represented by the Civil Rights Law, have been strengthened by liberal
statutory interpretation. 3 To fortify the statutory expression of this public
lectual life of the state; to encourage and promote the development and execution
by all persons within the state of such state programs; to eliminate and prevent
discrimination in employment, in places of public accommodation, resort or amuse-
ment, in educational institutions, in public services, in housing accommodations,
and in commercial space and to take other actions against discrimination as herein
provided; and the division established hereunder is hereby given general jurisdic-
tion and power for such purposes.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1974).
N. Y. CONST. art. I.
I! Sections 40 to 45 of the Civil Rights Law deal with the subject of equal rights in places
of public accommodation and amusement. For example, Section 40 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public ac-
commodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No person, being the owner,
lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any such place
shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, or directly or indi-
rectly publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed commu-
nication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld
from or denied to any person on account of race, creed, color or national origin, or
that the patronage or custom thereat, or any person belonging to or purporting to
be of any particular race, creed, color or national origin is unwelcome, objectionable
or not acceptable, desired or solicited. The production of any such written or
printed communication, notice or advertisement, purporting to relate to any such
place and to be made by any person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, superin-
tendent or manager thereof, shall be presumptive evidence in any civil or criminal
action that the same was authorized by such person . ...
N. Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW (McKinney 1974).
11 The Civil Rights Law is considered to be in derogation of the common law and thus is
restrictive of the liberty which a citizen ordinarly enjoys to deal only with those persons with
whom he chooses to hold business relations. See Christie v. 46th Street Theatre Corp., 265
A.D. 255, 39 N.Y.S.2d 454, aff'd 292 N.Y. 520, 54 N.E. 206, cert. denied 320 U.S. 710 (1943).
For this reason and because of the penal nature of the statute, it has at times been given a
strict construction by the courts. See Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 932,
aff'd 289 N.Y. 577, 43 N.E.2d 716, 31 N.Y.S.2d 834, (1942); see also Beckett v. Pfalffle, 157
N.Y.S. 247 (1916). However, it has also been clarified that where the statute is deemed to be
remedial in application, a liberal construction will be given effect. In Hobson v. York Studios,
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policy, statutes of more particular application also have been passed.' 4
Article 15 of the Executive Law is known as the Human Rights Law. The
statute designates certain discriminatory practices to be unlawful and cre-
ates a State Commission Against Discrimination.'5 This Commission" was
created to maintain the constitutional guarantee of civil rights, as well as
to effectuate the legislative policy against discrimination and violations of
state law."4 Against this broad background, the New York City antidis-
Inc., 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1955), an interracial couple brought an action before
the Municipal Court of the City of New York to recover the statutory penalty under section
41 of the Civil Rights Law by alleging the defendant refused to rent them a room in his hotel
because of their color. Judge Wahl, writing for the majority, held the evidence established
that the plaintiffs had experienced discrimination because of their race and in reference to
the Civil Rights Law noted, "[A] liberal intent conceived the statute. The proper office of
Civil Rights legislation is to search out hostility to our public policy and apply the proper
remedy." Id. at 892, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
1, For example, a life insurance company doing business within the state may not discrimi-
nate between persons on a racial basis. N.Y. INS. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1974). N.Y. JuD. LAW
§ 460 (McKinney 1974) states that "race, creed, color, national origin or sex" will not consti-
tute cause for refusing a person the bar examination or admission to practice as an attorney
or counselor. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 174 (McKinney 1974) provides that no license shall be
granted to conduct an employment agency where the agency name directly or indirectly
expresses or connotes discrimination; agencies licensed prior to the act are allowed to use the
name provided that they display under the name, wherever it appears, a statement to the
effect that the services are rendered without limitation, specification, or discrimination as to
race, color, creed or national origin.
,1 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1974) are of particular interest here. See N.Y.
EXEc. LAw § 290 (1).
Section 291 announces equality of opportunity to be a civil right:
(1) The opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination because of
race, creed, sex, color or national origin is hereby recognized and declared to be a
civil right.
(2) The opportunity to obtain education, the use of places of public accommoda-
tion and the ownership, use and occupancy of housing accommodations and com-
mercial space without discrimination because of race, creed, color or national ori-
gin, as specified in section two hundred ninety-six of this article, is hereby recog-
nized as and declared to be a civil right.
Section 293 creates a state division of human rights. Finally, section 296 specifically desig-
nates unlawful discriminatory practices.
" The Division for Human Rights was formerly known as the State Commission Against
Discrimination.
," The Division for Human Rights "is empowered to receive, investigate, and pass upon
complaints alleging violation of the law, and it may in the proper conduct of its duties hold
hearings and conduct investigations." N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 295 (McKinney 1974). The proce-
dure to be followed by a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discrimination
practice is set forth in section 297 and under the same section, the Commission may establish
rules of practice to govern, expedite, and effectuate the prescribed procedure. Section 298
provides for the enforcement of Commission orders, and for judicial review of such orders.
This section provides that the findings of the Commission as to the facts shall be conclusive
if supported by sufficient evidence on the record considered as a whole. Hence, a judicial
review of the findings of the Commission is limited to the question of whether the findings
are, upon the entire record, supported by evidence so substantial that an inference of the
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crimination ordinances provide a supplement on the municipal level.' 8 The
New York City laws contain, inter alia, specific provisions which prohibit
discriminatory practices, both direct and indirect, in advertising for em-
ployment. 9
The New York courts often have given expression to this local antidiscri-
mination policy in their decisions. 20 Specifically, the courts have expressed
intolerance for indirect as well as direct means of discrimination.2' This
intolerance is particularly evident in the field of advertising, where "code"
words or phrases implying discriminatory practices in the solicitation of
clientele or the selection of employees have been held to be violative of
various antidiscrimination statutes.22
existence of the fact found may be reasonably drawn. For a discussion of this point see
Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E. 2d 581 (1954).
11 See Feigenblum v. Comm'n on Human Rights of the City of New York, 53 Misc. 2d 360,
278 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1967) in which the court held the evidence before the Commission
supported its findings that a landlord refused to rent an apartment to an applicant because
of her color, which constituted a violation of the Civil Rights Law. The court specifically
commented that, by the state legislature's enacting the statute to give New York City concur-
rent jurisdiction with the State Commission on Human Rights, the legislature conclusively
demonstrated its intention not to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the state in the field of
discrimination in housing.
" See note 5 supra.
See, e.g., State Division of Human Rights v. Killian Manufacturing Corp., 35 N.Y.2d
201, 360 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1974), in which the court notes that the State of New York has been
a leader in the field of equal employment opportunity. See also Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y.
38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954), in which the court expressed the view that indirect discrimination,
although more subtle, is as deplorable as direct discrimination and should not be tolerated.
City of Schenectady v. State Division of Human Rights, 37 N.Y.2d 421, 373 N.Y.S.2d 59
(1975), stands for the principle that the courts should make certain that the legislative
purpose behind the Human Rights Law is not thwarted by a strict judicial construction of
the statute and a "battle with semantics."
21 In Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954), Judge Field observed,
"[olne intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected to declare or
announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue his discriminatory practices
in ways that are devious, by methods subtle and elusive for we deal with an area in which
'subtleties of conduct . . . play no small part."' Id. at 119 N.E.2d. at 584. See also, Hobson
v. York Studios Inc., 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1955); State Division of Human Rights
v. Killian Manufacturing Corp., supra note 20.
An important case in this area is Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., which
involved an action by the owners of a summer vacation camp against the New York Times
for breach of a contract to publish advertisements designed to solicit customers. The camp
facilities could only be used by "members" and in order to join the vacation club, written
applications, satisfactory references, and annual dues were required; consequently, the resort
owners had requested that the words "Selected Clientele" be included in its advertisement.
Acting in compliance with a notification from the District Attorney of New York County that
newspapers which published such advertisements would be prosecuted for a violation of § 40
of the Civil Rights Law, the New York Times refused to print the requested words in the ad.
In holding for the defendant newspaper the court commented,
[ulse of the words "selected clientele" is a mask and a subterfuge. It is merely a
cloak and disguise and an indirect means to hide discrimination. As a practical
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One of the major issues in the instant case is whether or not a geographic
reference to the nation of South Africa, contained in an advertisement for
employment within that country, was to be considered as a code word
denoting discrimination and, therefore, in violation of the New York City
Administrative Code.2 3 Judge Jasen, writing for the majority, reached the
result that such a geographic reference was not to be considered a code
word for discrimination by analyzing the relevant administrative code pro-
visions and by using a narrow definition of code word.24 According to the
majority, the test under the statute was not an evaluation of the actual
existence of discrimination which the evidence presented at the Commis-
sion hearing tended to emphasize, but, rather whether the particular ad-
vertisement expressed discrimination in employment on its face, either
directly or indirectly. 25 It was unquestioned that the advertisements did
not directly express discrimination.2 1 Consequently, the court employed a
definitional approach as to what would constitute a code word read indi-
rectly. The majority reasoned, "[c]ode words are discriminatory additions
matter, such words as "selected clientele" connote in the public mind that colored
persons, Jews, and others who are not lily-white need not apply to the plaintiff for
accommodation. That the alleged requirement of joining the vacation club is sham,
insincere, and mere pretence is clearly shown by a letter written to a prospective
customer...
Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times, 184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484 (1945). But
see Trowbridge v. Katzen, 23 Misc. 2d 111, 203 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1960), where the trial court in
overruling a Commission order, held that the phrase, "Serving Christian Clientele since
1911," described the type of persons who had predominantly patronized the resort described,
and its use did not imply that non-Christians were not wanted as patrons. The trial court
compared the phrase to other permissible phrases commonly found in resort advertisements,
such as "Italian cuisine," "French cooking," and "Kosher diet observed." The court further-
more distinguished the Camp-of-the-Pines case, stating that the phrase involved in that
case-"selected clientele"-was unacceptable because it suggested that the applicants to the
vacation club were selected from certain persons only, rather than simply denoting the pre-
dominant type of people who had joined the vacation club. Cf. United States v. Hunter, 459
F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 934. But see Hodgson v. Approved Personnel
Service, Inc., 529 F.2d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 1975).
11 The court limited its scope of review to two main issues: (1) a determination of whether
there is support, as a matter of law, for the Commission's finding that the Times violated
the antidiscrimination laws, and (2) whether such a finding would be precluded by either
principles of foreign policy or principles regarding freedom of the press. The Commission then
contended that the court was limited to a narrow scope of review under the substantial
evidence test. However, the court noted that the test for review applies only when the Com-
mission action under review concerns factual findings. The court freed itself from this stan-
dard by emphasizing that the Commission made no factual determination here; rather its
decision was characterized as a conclusion of law based upon an undisputed set of facts. The
court reasoned, "[tihe issue is simply whether or not the Commission properly analyzed the
law and we hold that it did not." 41 N.Y. 2d at 349, 361 N.E. 2d at 966, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
315.
11 Id. at 349-51, 361 N.E. 2d at 967, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 315-17.
5 Id. at 350, 361 N.E. 2d at 966-67, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
79 Misc. 2d at 1047, 362 N.Y.S. 2d at 322.
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to otherwise complete advertisements; the purpose is to signal the exist-
ence of an unlawful criterion. While employment location is an essential
ingredient to complete lawful advertisement and its mention is crucial to
the advertisement, a discriminatory code word adds nothing but invidous
unfairness. It is the code word, not the geographic reference, which ex-
presses discrimination."'
The dissent agreed with the majority's position on this point but empha-
sized more strongly the line of decisions holding that disguised discrimina-
tion in advertising through the use of code words is not to be allowed.2 The
dissent disagreed with the distinction made by the majority between a
code word for discrimination and a geographic reference, which is, it recog-
nized, a valid part of an employment advertisement. In dissent, Judges
Fuchberg and Cooke concluded that a term which signals discrimination
might also convey other information, such as the location of an employer,
but such an attribute did not render the term any less discriminatory.29
Although the majority opinion devoted much discussion to the statutory
basis for its reversal of the Commission's findings, it also relied heavily on
the position that municipal agencies, such as the New York City Commis-
sion, should not be allowed to formulate their own foreign policy through
the enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes.10 It was the majority's posi-
tion that the Commission considered the discriminatory policies of the
government of South Africa to be an integral part of the advertisements
in the Times and that the order of the Commission, though directed at the
New York Times, was really an attempt to impose an economic boycott
against South Africa.'
41 N.Y. 2d at 351, 361 N.E. 2d at 967, 393 N.Y.S. 2d at 316.
z, The dissent cites the following cases for support: City of Schenectady v. State Division
of Human Rights, 37 N.Y. 2d 421, 373 N.Y.S. 2d 59 (1975). United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205, cert. denied 409 U.S. 934 (2d Cir. 1972), holding that newspaper advertisements which
stated that certain apartments for rent were located in a "white home" indicated a racial
preference, and therefore were prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(c) (1970); Camp-of-the-Pines, Inc. v. New York Times Co., 184 Misc. 2d 111, 53 N.Y.S.2d
475 (1945); Hodgson v. Approved Personel Service, Inc., 529 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1975), stating
that "trigger words" in advertising can be discriminatory, and if found to be discriminatory
are violative of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (e) (1970).
2 The dissent contends that
[ain advertisement setting forth South Africa as the location of the employment
clearly connotes, as effectively as code words, that "Only Whites Need Apply." It
also seems to us that it begs the question to place significance in the fact that the
place name was part of an otherwise "complete lawful advertisement." Obviously
a word which signals discrimination does no less because it conveys other informa-
tion as well.
41 N.Y.2d at 359, 361 N.E.2d at 972, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
0 Id. at 352-53, 361 N.E.2d at 968. See also, Reeves Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of
Law-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (1960), for a discussion of policy reasons why state and
municipal courts should not make decisions regarding the actions of foreign states committed
within those states.
1 41 N.Y.2d at 351-52, 361 N.E.2d at 968, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17.
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Precedent on both state and federal levels, essentially those decisions
representing the Act of State Doctrine, exist in support of the principle
that states and state agencies should not interfere with the foreign policy
authority of the federal government.2 The essence of the Act of State
Doctrine is the principle that domestic courts of the United States should
not make decisions regarding acts of foreign nations committed within
boundaries of those nations, for the reason that such decisions affect for-
eign policy, an area exclusively reserved for federal action.3 While the
cases cited by the majority may well have been factually distinguishable
from the Times situation, the majority based its position on that same
broad principle of noninterference by domestic courts contained in those
cases;' thus, the impact of the factual distinctions was minimized.
The dissent was again at odds with this argument propounded by the
majority and contended that the majority's application of the classic Act
of State Doctrine cases was erroneous. Stressing the factual distinctions
which the majority opinion had ignored, the dissent took the position that,
while it had been held that the courts of the United States lack jurisdiction
to review acts or policies of foreign nations occurring within those nations,
the action under review by the New York City Commission-the place-
ment of employment advertisements in the New York Times-was within
New York State and, thus, was reviewable. 35 The dissent further noted that
the Commission's action was not aimed at the South African government;
it merely ordered a New York corporation to stop running discriminatory
advertisements which aided and abetted discrimination occurring else-
32 In support of its position, the majority cites the following for support: Hatch v. Baez, 7
Hun. 596, 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) where the court, in this early New York decision, declared
that "the universal comity of nations and the established rules of international law require
the courts of one country . . . to abstain from sitting in judgment on the acts of another
government, done within its own territory," and Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897). In that famous decision, an American citizen, forcibly detained in Venezuela for
several days by revolutionaries, subsequently brought a tort action against one of the military
commanders of the successful insurgents, who, prior to judicial consideration of the case, was
recognized by the United States as the government of Venezuela. In the opinion, Chief Justice
Fuller stated: "[elvery sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory." See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Supreme Court, in this opinion, described the Hatch v.
Baez decision, supra, as having "foreshadowed" the case of Underhill v. Hernandez.
"1 See Reeves, note 31. See generally Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal
Courts, 70 L.Q. REv. 181 (1954), for a broad, theoretical commentary on the consequences of
municipal action regarding foreign states.
11 41 N.Y.2d at 353, 361 N.E.2d at 972, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 318. See generally Comment, The
Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Public and Private International Law, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1278 (1962) for an excellent historical discussion of the act of state doctrine and a
discussion of the feasibility of administration of public international law by municipal courts.
41 N.Y.2d at 361, 361 N.E.2d at 972, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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where. " In essence then, the dissent rejected both the majority's notion of
an attempted economic boycott and its conservative approach to the rela-
tionship between the decisions of the domestic courts of the United States
and foreign policy.
Besides the obvious differences in statutory and case law interpretation,
the majority and dissent disagreed about the judicial alpproach to be ap-
plied when the courts and agencies of the United States become involved
in disputes with foreign policy overtones. 37 The majority need have gone
no further than statutory analysis in order to substantiate its decision. But
this case may represent a regression from the broad inroads made by the
New York courts against indirect discrimination in advertising. It is, per-
haps, a more cautious approach to statutory interpretation, reflecting the
court's evaluation of a potentially volatile situation from the standpoint
of foreign policy, and may have been chosen in preference to a broad
decisional alternative which could be easily misconstrued and misused.
The majority may have taken an overly cautious position in assuming
that the Commission was in fact trying to impose an economic boycott
against the country of South Africa. As the dissent pointed out, the order
given by the Commission was aimed only at the New York Times. On the
other hand, the majority's conclusion is plausible when one considers that
the evidence presented at the Commission hearing dealt almost entirely
with South African law as being discriminatory."8 The agency's open criti-
36 The dissent comments, "South Africa is not a party to this proceeding. Above all, the
order of the Commission makes no attempt to decide or determine the rights of South Africa
to engage within that nation what we would regard as discrimination." Id. at 360.
17 The case of Zchernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), succinctly expresses the majority
view in the principal case. That decision involved the question of whether or not residents of
East Germany, who were heirs of United States citizens, could properly inherit personal
property in the State of Oregon, under the probate law of Oregon. The United States Supreme
Court, reviewing the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court, reasoned it
inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international
relations in a persistent and subtle way. The practice of state courts in witholding
remittances to legatees residing in Communist countries or in preventing them from
assigning them is notorious. The several states, of course, have traditionally regu-
lated the descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way
if they impair the effective exercise of the nation's foreign policy.
Id. at 440.
Another author has expressed a similar view:
The executive, by virtue of its power to negotiate treaties and conduct diplomatic
relations, represents the nation in the drafting of international conventions and the
development of customary diplomatic practice-primary sources of international
law. Irrespective of whether the executive's view of international law is deemed
binding on the judiciary, the courts can not gracefully make an independent finding
on a point of international law that is at variance with the nation's diplomatic
position as delineated by the executive.
Comment, supra note 34, at 1307.
' 41 N.Y.2d at 347-48, 361 N.E.2d at 965, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 314.
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cism was directed more at South African policies than at the New York
Times. 9 From such a perspective the court's reluctance to affirm such
action is understandable.
Finally, it should be noted that while the dissent's analysis of the case
law relating to the Act of State Doctrine may be sound, it does not effec-
tively counter the majority position. The dissent argues technical points
of application of specific case holdings to the situation at bar; however, the
majority stance apparently has at its base the doctrine's policy considera-
tions of noninterference by domestic courts in sensitive areas of foreign
affairs. While the approach of the court may be a cautious one, it is prefer-
able to an approach which could jeopardize both the effectiveness and
uniformity of United States foreign policy.
Nancy L. Rumble
:' Id. at 358, 361 N.E. 2d at 969, 393 N.Y.S. 2d at 320.
